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equity, the major asset for most middle-income older households. Yet tapping home equity is difficult: 
most people are reluctant to downsize and, even when they do, they rarely reduce their housing expenses. 
Reverse mortgages are an option, but most households are put off by the enormity of the decision, the 
complexity of the product, and the high up-front costs. A statewide property tax deferral program 
overcomes the hurdles to accessing home equity. Property tax deferral does not provide access to as 
much home equity as a reverse mortgage, but the offsetting advantage is that some of the house value 
after the repayment of the loan and interest will be available for a bequest. At the household level, the 
proposed program is revenue-neutral: all taxes owed by a participating household are paid back, with 
interest sufficient to cover borrowing costs and administrative expenses. But because loans are made 
well in advance of repayments, the sponsor of the plan must cover start-up costs. In Massachusetts, if 
the state government simply borrowed money to cover the annual outlays, the state’s ratio of debt-to-GSP 
would rise from 14.0 percent to 15.1 percent. The alternative is to involve the private sector. This decision 
would raise the costs to homeowners, but nevertheless it may be necessary to get a broad-based 
program up and running. 
Keywords 
Retiree, homeowner, home equity, tapping home equity, property tax, property tax deferral, property tax 
relief, reverse mortgage 
Disciplines 
Economics 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/679 
 
Property Tax Deferral:  
Can a Public/Private Partnership Help Provide Lifetime Income?  
 
Alicia H. Munnell, Wenliang Hou, and Abigail N. Walters 
 







Pension Research Council Working Paper 
Pension Research Council 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
3620 Locust Walk, 3302 SH-DH 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302 























The authors thank Joseph Craven (former Deputy Treasurer of the Massachusetts’ Pension Investment Division and 
former Managing Director of Retirement Policy at BlackRock) for his detailed review of the draft and extremely 
helpful comments. His insights were an invaluable addition to the paper. 
 
All findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper represent the views of the author and not those of the 
Wharton School or the Pension Research Council. © 2020 Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania. All rights reserved. 
 
Property Tax Deferral: Can a Public/Private Partnership Help Provide Lifetime Income?  
 
 




Many retirees will not have enough money from conventional retirement programs to maintain 
their standard of living once they stop working.  To help support themselves, they will need to tap 
their home equity, the major asset for most middle-income older households.  Yet tapping home 
equity is difficult: most people are reluctant to downsize and, even when they do, they rarely reduce 
their housing expenses. Reverse mortgages are an option, but most households are put off by the 
enormity of the decision, the complexity of the product, and the high up-front costs. A statewide 
property tax deferral program overcomes the hurdles to accessing home equity. Property tax 
deferral does not provide access to as much home equity as a reverse mortgage, but the offsetting 
advantage is that some of the house value after the repayment of the loan and interest will be 
available for a bequest. At the household level, the proposed program is revenue-neutral: all taxes 
owed by a participating household are paid back, with interest sufficient to cover borrowing costs 
and administrative expenses. But because loans are made well in advance of repayments, the 
sponsor of the plan must cover start-up costs.  In Massachusetts, if the state government simply 
borrowed money to cover the annual outlays, the state’s ratio of debt-to-GSP would rise from 14.0 
percent to 15.1 percent. The alternative is to involve the private sector.  This decision would raise 
the costs to homeowners, but nevertheless it may be necessary to get a broad-based program up 
and running. 
 
Keywords: Retiree, homeowner, home equity, tapping home equity, property tax, property tax 







Center for Retirement Research 
Boston College 
258 Hammond Street 
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA  
Wenliang Hou  
Senior Research Advisor 
Center for Retirement Research 
Boston College 
258 Hammond Street 
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA 
Abigail N. Walters  
Senior Research Associate  
Center for Retirement Research 
Boston College 
258 Hammond Street 




Property Tax Deferral:  
Can a Public/Private Partnership Help Provide Lifetime Income?  
 
In many states, qualified senior homeowners can defer their property taxes for as long as 
they stay in their home. By reducing taxes upfront, such programs free up money that can be used 
for other purposes, providing a stream of income for life that is very similar to having an annuity. 
The deferred amounts are repaid with interest when the person sells the home or dies, so the 
programs have no long-run cost for states or localities. Despite these advantages, eligibility is 
limited and take-up is low. A proposed redesign to the tax deferral program in Massachusetts 
would (1) open up the program by removing income limits; (2) simplify sign-up; and (3) have the 
state – rather than the localities – finance the program. This proposal raises issues both with respect 
to the potential demand for the option, as well as the potential role for a public/private partnership 
to finance the start-up costs when loans far exceed repayments. This paper provides a case for 
property tax deferral, proposes some design elements, estimates potential costs, and calls for 
additional ideas to explore how such a broad-based program might work.  
In what follows, we first describe the nation’s retirement income challenge and the 
particular problem in states with high housing costs, using Massachusetts as an example. Next we 
describe the major existing programs for homeowner tax relief in Massachusetts: two that cost the 
government, and one that allows low-income homeowners to help themselves through limited 
property tax deferral. Our third section describes the proposal for a new statewide program of 
property tax deferral that would be open to all homeowners. A fourth section addresses likely 
utilization, including an assessment of whether people stay in their homes long enough to make 
property tax deferral a reasonable option. The fifth section discusses possible roles for the public 
and private sectors in the financing of such a program, particularly shortfalls in the early years. 
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The sixth section discusses the impact of a property tax deferral on homeowners by comparing 
outcomes under such a program with those available through reverse mortgages. Our final section 
concludes that a comprehensive property tax deferral program would provide retirees an efficient 
way to access their home equity and secure their retirement. 
 
The Retirement Income Challenge 
Many retirees are unlikely to have sufficient income to maintain their standards of living 
once they stop working. The National Retirement Risk Index (NRRI), which relies on data from 
the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, compares projected replacement rates – 
benefits as a percentage of pre-retirement earnings – to target replacement rates that permit 
households to enjoy the same consumption before and after retirement. 1  The current NRRI 
estimate shows that about half of today’s working-age households are at risk – the risk is larger 
for the bottom third of households but is also substantial for those in the middle and top of the 
income distribution (Figure 1). Therefore, the problem is widespread.  
Figure 1 here 
The reasons for this shortfall are twofold: (1) Baby Boomers and generations that follow 
are going to need more retirement resources; and (2) traditional sources of retirement income are 
providing less support than in the past.  
On the needs side, the drivers are longer life expectancies coupled with relatively early 
retirement ages, rising health care costs, and very low interest rates. These factors combined mean 
that people are going to need to accumulate substantially more retirement resources now than in 
the past. On the income side, social security will provide less relative to pre-retirement earnings 
because of the rise in the ‘Full Retirement Age’ from 65 to 67. In addition, higher Medicare 
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premiums and the taxation of social security benefits for more households will lower net benefits. 
Furthermore, the program faces a 75-year deficit, and additional benefit cuts could be part of a 
package to restore balance. 
The other major source of retirement income, the private retirement system, is not working 
well for much of the population. Due to the lack of universal coverage, many households end up 
with no source of retirement income other than social security. And for those households that do 
have a retirement plan, balances are often modest. In 2016, the typical working household with a 
401(k) plan approaching retirement (ages 55-64) had only $135,000 in combined 401(k)/IRA 
assets (Munnell and Chen, 2017). That may sound like a lot to some, but it could provide only 
$600 per month in retirement income.  
However bleak the outlook for the nation as a whole, the situation in high property tax 
states is more serious. The Gerontology Institute at the University of Massachusetts-Boston 
calculates – for each state – the Elder Economic Insecurity Rate, which is the percentage of single 
individuals and couples with income below the level required to cover basic living expenses. The 
most recent report shows that, of the ten states with the highest Elder Economic Insecurity Rate, 
seven have high levels of property tax (Figure 2). The high property taxes mean that high-income 
states such as Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and California have about the same 
percentage of elderly at risk as low-income states such as Mississippi, Maine, and Louisiana. 
Policymakers in a number of states have recognized the problem created by high housing costs 
and have attempted to provide some relief.   




Existing Provisions for Property Tax Relief   
Twenty-four states currently offer some seniors the ability to defer all of their property 
taxes until their home is sold or the owners are deceased.2 Eligibility depends on age, residence, 
on income (in most instances), and in some instances, on property value. Program parameters are 
usually set at the state level, but municipalities generally administer the programs and can often 
adjust their eligibility criteria and interest rates. Typically, eligible homeowners must be age 65 or 
older and have an annual household income under $20,000. The typical interest rate charged on 
property tax deferrals is about six percent. But these key program parameters vary widely across 
states and municipalities. In nine states – Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, 
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin – the state finances the program, sending money to the local 
governments to offset lost revenue.  
Massachusetts provides an example of how states attempt to alleviate the burden of 
homeownership for older residents. The state currently has three programs for property tax relief.3 
Two are transfer, or welfare, programs. The Circuit Breaker Tax Credit, administered at the state 
level, provides a credit against the state income tax to taxpayers age 65+ who own or rent 
residential property in Massachusetts. The credit equals the amount by which real estate tax 
payments and half of water and sewer bills exceed 10 percent of the taxpayer’s income.4 The 
maximum credit is $1,130. The amount of the credit is subject to limitations based on the 
taxpayer’s total income and the assessed value of the real estate (Table 1). This program costs the 
state about $80 million per year. The second program is Senior Property Tax Exemptions, 
administered at the local level; it provides a $500 exemption on the property tax bill for those age 
70+ who meet specific ownership, residency, income, and asset requirements. Cities and towns, 
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which bear the cost of this exemption, can increase the exempt amount to $1,000 and reduce the 
age to 65. In 2019, cities and towns granted about $10 million in property tax exemptions.  
Table 1 here  
The third program is the Senior Property Tax Deferral program, which allows local 
governments to permit some seniors to defer payment of their property taxes and to recoup those 
taxes plus interest when the homeowner sells the house or dies. The state sets the program 
parameters but allows localities some flexibility. For example, the state’s maximum gross income 
for participants is $20,000, but local governments can raise that limit to $60,000 (the Circuit 
Breaker limit for a single non-head of household).5 Similarly, the state sets a maximum interest 
rate of eight percent, but localities can adopt a lower rate. The total value of liens against the 
property cannot exceed 50 percent of the assessed market value.6 Once the homeowner sells the 
home or dies, deferred taxes and accumulated interest must be paid back within six months, during 
which interest accrues at a rate of 16 percent.7   
Figure 3 shows that participation in all three programs is limited. In the case of the Circuit 
Breaker Tax Credit and the Senior Property Tax Exemptions, participation clearly reflects income 
restrictions for eligibility. In the case of the local property tax deferral program, other factors 
appear to be at play as well. First, many homeowners are not aware of the program (since, given 
the potential financial burden, only wealthy communities tend to publicize their programs) and 
confuse it with other tax credit and exemption programs. Second, homeowners who are eligible 
and aware may not know how to apply, are concerned about a stigma attached to an income-tested 
program, view the interest rate as too high (especially during the pay-back period), or hesitate to 
place a lien on their home. A new statewide Property Tax Deferral Program could address many 
of these shortcomings.  
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Figure 3 here 
 
A Proposal for a New Statewide Property Tax Deferral Program  
The proposed program would not be based on income but rather would be open to all 
homeowners in Massachusetts age 65+. Deferrals would be based on the first $1,000,000 of 
assessed value on a primary residence; this amount would be adjusted each year to keep pace with 
inflation. The rationales for this approach are fivefold. First, the problem of inadequate retirement 
income is not limited to low-income homeowners; the NRRI shows that many homeowners in the 
top and middle thirds of the income distribution also will be at risk in retirement. Second, the 
program is self-financing: homeowners repay the deferred property with interest when they move 
or die. Third, universal eligibility eliminates stigma associated with the program and would 
enhance its acceptability. Fourth, the absence of income limits simplifies the administration of the 
program and avoids people being denied access should they make a large 401(k) withdrawal in a 
given year. Finally, history suggests that programs for poor people often turn out to be poor 
programs, so universal participation enhances the chances for the program’s success.  
The program would function as follows (see Appendix A for further details): 
• Individuals age 65+ with a primary residence in Massachusetts would be able to defer their 
property taxes until the sum of deferrals, accumulated interest, and mortgages reached 60 
percent of the first million dollars of assessed value.  
• Participation in the program would be triggered by simply checking a box on the city or 
town’s first-quarter property tax bill (see Appendix B for a sample tax bill). 
• The city or town would continue to have an automatic lien on the home for the unpaid 
municipal property taxes; this lien would still be senior to other liens such as mortgages.8   
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• When the city or town forwards the tax bill to the state, the state would send the city or 
town an amount equal to the deferred taxes. 
• The interest rate each year would be set at the state’s borrowing cost plus a buffer to cover 
administrative costs and defaults.  
• Once notified that the homeowner has moved or died, the city or town would collect the 
deferred taxes plus interest upon the sale of the property and remit this amount to the state.  
• The deferred taxes and interest would be due within one year, after which the interest rate 
penalty would begin.  
This new program would achieve several important goals. First, an average older 
homeowner in Massachusetts (without a mortgage) would be able to defer about $5,000 a year in 
property taxes (see Appendix C). This amount substantially exceeds the funds provided though the 
state’s existing tax deferral, exemption, and credit programs, which could be phased out gradually 
for homeowners (retaining the Circuit Breaker for renters) as part of this initiative. The homeowner 
could choose to defer for a single year to cover, say, the cost of a new roof, or to defer on an annual 
basis to supplement social security and any other retirement income – although such flexibility 
raises some administrative issues.9   
Second, property tax deferral would help seniors to age in their own homes. Survey after 
survey finds that people strongly prefer to stay in their own communities (AARP 2014; Age Wave 
2015; Hodgson 2021). Moreover, enabling those with dementia to be cared for in their own home 
by a combination of family and outside support could help control future Medicaid costs. Aging 
in place also allows homeowners to enjoy appreciation in the market value of their homes. 
Reducing the costs associated with home ownership would increase the ability of older 
homeowners to achieve these outcomes.  
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 Third, the program would alleviate the burden on Massachusetts’ local governments. Under 
current provisions, widespread use of a tax deferral program would have a significant short-term 
impact on local budgets. The proposed program removes this burden by having the state advance 
to cities and towns the deferral amount and receive the money it is owed when houses are sold. 
In 2019, Massachusetts legislators introduced two significant bills to enhance the ability of 
senior homeowners to defer their property taxes. The first bill – H.3617 ‘An Act relative to senior 
property tax deferral’ – would immediately improve the existing income-tested program by 
reducing residency tenure requirements, increasing income eligibility to the level of the Circuit 
Breaker Tax Credit, reducing the default interest rate, and delaying the interest rate penalty to a 
year after the homeowner’s death. The second bill – S.1693 ‘A Resolve providing for an 
investigation and study by a special commission relative to a senior state property tax deferral 
program’ – proposed a three-year pilot to test a universal state-run program open to all households 
ages 65 and over, modeled after the proposal described above. Under this new program, local 
governments would still administer the program, while the state would handle the finances. A pilot 
program would help answer key questions like what percentage of people will participate, how 
much start-up funding is needed, and the program’s effect on the economic security of 
homeowners. The following sections describe what is known currently about each of these topics.  
 
Program Participation 
The extent to which homeowners participate in a property tax deferral program depends, 
in part, on the stability of housing patterns: that is, does it make sense for people to tap their home 
equity to cover expenses in retirement, or will they need it for a subsequent move? Participation 
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also depends on how well the program is publicized and understood by potential participants, and 
on the ease of the application process. 
The stability of housing patterns. A potential reason that homeowners may be reluctant to borrow 
against their houses is the concern that, if they did decide to move, they would have to pay back 
the loan with interest and could be left with inadequate resources at a vulnerable time in their lives.  
A recent study examined the stability of homeownership, precisely to assess whether 
borrowing against home equity is a reasonable option (Munnell et al. 2020), using data from the 
1992-2016 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). To describe the typical housing 
trajectories of people in their 50s until death required the creation of a synthetic cohort, ‘splicing’ 
together two cohorts to create a complete picture of late-life housing trajectories. Sequence 
analysis was used to group together common residential patterns among homeowners who move. 
The analysis uncovered four groups (Figure 4).  
Figure 4 here 
The first two groups could be characterized as ‘never movers’ and ‘stable movers.’ Group 
1 (53%) are those who never move from the original home they owned in their early 50s. Group 2 
(17%) moves around retirement into a new owner-occupied home and then generally stays in that 
new home until death. Both of these groups end up with substantially more housing wealth than 
the movers the last time they are observed. The movers consist of two distinct groups – ‘frequent 
movers’ (Group 3) and ‘late movers’ (Group 4). The ‘frequent movers’ (14%) end up with less 
combined housing and financial wealth than any other group at the end of the observation period. 
The ‘late movers’ (16%) stay in their original homes until their 80s and then move into either a 
rental or a long term services and support (LTSS) facility, likely due to a health impairment. 
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The overall conclusion is that most homeowners – the exception being the ‘frequent 
movers’ – experience enough residential stability to tap home equity through property tax 
deferrals. The question is whether they would choose to participate.      
Participation rates in existing programs. To date, property tax deferral programs appear to be 
used infrequently. As noted above, one practical hurdle is awareness of their existence: the 
programs are generally administered locally and have limited budgets for outreach.10 In addition, 
the actual process of applying poses a barrier, as potential participants must often mail or deliver 
tax returns, deeds, and birth certificates with application forms. Despite these hurdles, over 10 
percent of eligible homeowners in Oregon participated in its property tax deferral program from 
the mid-1980s to mid-1990s – a period of rising property tax rates and high interest rates for 
consumer loans.11    
One could expect participation in an improved Massachusetts program to exceed that of 
Oregon, since the property tax burden is substantial, the program would be well publicized, and 
participation would require homeowners simply to check a box on their tax bills. In that 
environment, one would expect that participation would be driven by need. The NRRI, based on 
data from the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), predicts that – without using their home 
equity – 61 percent of homeowners age 55-59 will be at risk in retirement, compared to just 33 
percent of this group if home equity is used. A little over half of these homeowners report a strong 
bequest motive (34%) and are probably unlikely to participate in the program. But those with no 
bequest motive (11%) may well be willing to defer taxes, and perhaps half of those with a weak 
bequest motive (17%) as well. These assumptions yield the estimate of roughly a 20-percent 




Financing a Statewide Program 
The proposed property tax deferral program would be revenue neutral at the household 
level; the state provides the cities and towns the money up front and recoups the outlay with interest 
when the home is sold. Two buffers in the proposal would reduce risks to the sponsor. First, a 
surcharge of 50 basis points could be added to the interest rate to cover administrative costs. 
Second, deferrals would be capped to protect the sponsor against a decline in home value below 
the amount owed due to a failure to maintain the home or a more general decline in housing prices.  
While stopping deferrals once a homeowner owes more than a set percentage of the home’s 
assessed value in deferred taxes, interest, and mortgage protects the sponsor, it could force some 
homeowners to start paying taxes again after years of deferrals. Thus, setting the appropriate cap 
involves striking a balance between protecting the sponsor and protecting homeowners. A cap at 
60 percent appears to balance these interests. To reach this cap, a 65-year-old homeowner without 
a mortgage could defer taxes every year for over 40 years – a situation that few homeowners would 
experience (Table 2). From the sponsor's perspective, this cap would leave at least 40 percent of 
the first million dollars of home value as a buffer to ensure that proceeds from selling the house 
would be sufficient to repay the deferred taxes plus interest.12  In a similar vein, the cap would 
limit the risk to the sponsor of falling property values, as the dollar amount of the cap would 
fluctuate with changes in the assessed value.  
Table 2 here 
While a cap and a buffer on the interest rate should protect the sponsor from losses, the 
program start-up would involve an extended period when deferred property tax payments exceed 
the amounts recouped from the sale of houses due to a move or the death of the homeowner. The 
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financial shortfall would need to be covered either by the state or some arrangement with the 
private sector.  
To get a sense of the pattern of the shortfall during the start-up and to understand the factors 
that could affect its size, consider a world where the amount of property taxes collected did not 
increase and the population of homeowners over 65 is constant. In this simple model, the amount 
required to finance a property tax deferral program will be highest in the first year of the program, 
then decline each year thereafter as people exit the program and pay back the taxes they deferred. 
The total outstanding amount therefore grows quickly at first before stabilizing when taxes paid 
back equal new deferrals. 
In reality, home prices do increase, the population over age 65 grows, and interest and 
administrative expenses accrue each year. So instead of reaching a steady state, the revolving debt 
account will grow. The cost projections presented below take all these factors into account. In 
addition, the assumption is that the 20 percent of homeowners age 65+ who are estimated to 
participate in the program defer taxes every year until the last homeowner dies. The results of the 
model show that – with a five-year phase-in – the program would require about $100 million in 
new loans in the first year, with the amount rising to $555 million in 2026 before declining (see 
Figure 5). The question is how to finance these shortfalls, particularly during the start-up period.  
Figure 5 here 
A public approach. In our view, the most efficient approach would be for the state of 
Massachusetts to cover the costs through borrowing. That is, when an age 65+ household in Natick, 
MA checks the box on its property tax bill indicating a decision to defer its $5,000 in property 
taxes, Natick would automatically have a lien against the home for the deferred taxes. Natick 
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would notify the state and the state would then forward $5,000 to Natick. The state then needs 
some way to cover the $5,000 expenditure and associated interest costs in its budget.  
Since general obligation bonds are typically utilized only for capital expenditures, and the 
terms of the bonds are typically tied to the projects that are being funded, the most logical vehicle 
would be debt based on anticipated revenues. This approach could involve Revenue Anticipation 
Notes (RANs) or Tax Anticipation Notes (TANs), which are general obligations of the state but 
are repaid with the revenues or taxes collected at some point in the future. Traditionally, these 
notes are shorter-term obligations (almost like commercial paper), typically repaid within the same 
fiscal year. But experts suggest that the proposed legislation could extend that term. For example, 
in the early 1990s, the state issued seven-year general obligation debt to fund the deficit, in 
anticipation of revenues to be collected in the future. Regardless of the specific approach taken, 
homeowners would only be charged the low interest rate that states pay on debt, which is exempt 
from federal and state personal income tax.  
The bond deal would be much easier to structure if interest were paid to the bond holders 
each year. One option is for the state to front the interest out of its budget each year and get repaid 
when the property is sold. Some experts are skeptical, however, that the state would be willing to 
take on this responsibility – even though the interest would amount to only a tiny fraction of the 
budget. A second option is for the homeowner to pay the interest and administrative surcharge 
each year instead of including these costs in the deferred amount. While the latter approach would 
simplify the bond deal and substantially reduce borrowing amounts, it would also complicate the 
program and perhaps dissuade homeowners from participating. Of course, the alternative is not to 
pay the interest each year but rather issue zero-coupon bonds, which is a way to finance the interest 
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through borrowing. But zero-coupon bonds are more expensive and rarely used by state 
governments. In any event, financing the accruing interest would need to be addressed.  
For calculating the cost of the program, we have assumed that the interest on the deferred 
taxes is financed by borrowing. The borrowed amounts would add to Massachusetts’ outstanding 
debt, which currently equals about 14 percent of Gross State Product (GSP). At its peak, program 
borrowing would increase Massachusetts debt outstanding from 14.0 percent to 15.1 percent of 
GSP (Figure 6).13 Thereafter, the program’s impact would decline steadily. The key question for 
the state is whether the additional borrowing would affect its credit rating. One would think that 
since the deferred taxes are secured by liens on the properties, rating agencies would conclude that 
the financial strength of the state had not been compromised.   
Figure 6 here 
In the end, the state must decide if it is willing to take on the financing of a broad-based 
property tax deferral program. If the state is reluctant to do so, the obvious question is whether 
private sources of funding would be available. 
Relying on the private sector. It is possible that a private sector company might be interested in 
funding a property tax deferral program, providing it generated a meaningful volume of 
transactions. One approach might involve a private financial intermediary working directly with 
the cities and towns. That is, when a 65-year-old Natick homeowner checks the box that it would 
like to defer $5,000 of property taxes, the private company would give the town of Natick $5,000 
and then take an assignment of the deferred tax amounts and the related lien on the homeowner’s 
house. The company would repeat this process with other Massachusetts cities and towns. The 
attractiveness of such a proposition would depend in the first instance on the interest rate the 
company could charge the homeowner. But even with an interest rate noticeably above that 
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charged by the state, the company might have to wait 30 years or more to get its $5,000 back plus 
interest. To get an immediate payment, the company could potentially package together a batch of 
these loans, securitize them, and sell the securitization instruments on the open market. The success 
of such transactions depends on how receptive investors are to the new security.  
The costs of a private company dealing with 300+ cities and towns in Massachusetts at the 
local level could be prohibitively expensive. Alternatively, the private financial intermediary could 
work directly with the state, whereby the state would aggregate all the property tax deferrals and 
related tax liens. It would then sell these claims to the private financial intermediary, which would 
securitize them and sell the securities. This approach would require less private sector 
involvement, but the state would have to charge a rate higher than its general obligation borrowing 
rate to compensate the financial intermediary for liquidating these claims earlier in the process.  
One option might be to have the state’s portion of the program overseen by the 
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MassHousing).14 This state agency offers numerous 
programs to facilitate home ownership, so a property tax deferral program might be a logical 
addition to its portfolio. The agency has the ability to issue tax-exempt debt, and it also issues 
mortgage debt which it then securitizes. Given its focus and expertise, Mass Housing might be 
able to facilitate the private financing of a state property tax deferral program. 
These two approaches represent different options for how involved a private company 
could be in managing the program. In the first instance, the private financial intermediary could 
take on the task of providing educational materials for the local officials. In the second instance, 
the company could work directly with the state or Mass Housing to structure and manage the 
program. A question of sequencing also arises. The government could get the program up and 
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running by issuing government debt and then, if reluctant to increase its indebtedness further, 
invite a private financial intermediary to purchase and securitize these claims.  
The involvement of the private sector involves a clear tradeoff. The costs to the homeowner 
would be higher with private sector involvement, but a less expensive publicly financed program 
is of no use to anyone if it is never enacted.  
 
Effects on Homeowners 
Tapping home equity would provide a way for many resource-strapped seniors to make 
ends meet or to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living. In fact, for many households, 
particularly those with less wealth, their home equity is larger than their financial assets. They 
could access their equity most directly by selling the house and purchasing a smaller, less 
expensive house for their retirement. Such a shift would not only produce a bundle of cash but also 
may reduce the expenses associated with homeownership. The problem is that most retirees are 
attached to their homes and want to age in place. For retirees who want to stay put, the only 
alternative is to borrow against their home. This borrowing could be done through a state property 
tax deferral program or a reverse mortgage.  
Property tax deferrals and reverse mortgages are similar in three ways: (1) they require 
homeowners to occupy the home as their primary residence;15 (2) they allow older homeowners 
to tap their home equity while remaining in their home; and (3) they are repaid when the borrowers 
sell the home, no longer occupy it as a primary residence, or die. Yet these approaches also differ 
along three dimensions: complexity, cost, and access to funds.  
Complexity. Relative to reverse mortgages, property tax deferrals are a simple way to tap home 
equity. Essentially all reverse mortgages are government-insured Home Equity Conversion 
Mortgages (HECMs), available to homeowners age 62+.  The application process is daunting, and 
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borrowers need to meet many requirements before they can be approved for a reverse mortgage. 
They need to:  
• certify that at least one of the owners is over age 62;  
• own the property free and clear or have paid down a considerable amount;  
• verify their income, assets, monthly living expenses, and credit history;  
• have a history of timely payment for real estate taxes and hazard and flood insurance;  
• have no delinquency on any federal debt;  
• ensure that the property meets all of the Federal Housing Authority’s standards and flood 
requirements; and  
• participate in a consumer information session given by a HUD-approved HECM 
counselor.  
In comparison, homeowners applying for a property tax deferral would only need to certify that:  
•  at least one of the owners is over age 65; and 
• they owe less than 60 percent of the property’s assessed value in deferred taxes, accrued 
interest, and mortgages.   
While mandatory counseling sessions would not be required for property tax deferral, a major 
educational initiative by cities and towns would be needed to ensure that applicants fully 
understood that deferring taxes – in the absence of appreciation in house prices – reduces the 
amount that could be left to their heirs. But property tax deferral – checking a box on the property 
tax bill – is an infinitely easier way to access home equity than taking out a reverse mortgage.  
Costs. Two types of costs can be involved in accessing home equity: up-front costs to gain access 
to the product and interest costs associated with the loan (to be repaid in both cases when the 
homeowner moves or dies).  
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Reverse mortgages have both up-front costs and an interest charge on funds borrowed. In 
the case of a $500,000 house, the upfront cost would total about $19,000 – a $6,000 origination 
fee, a $10,000 insurance premium, and $2,500 in other closing costs. 16 In terms of costs of 
borrowed funds, the interest rate is set at 2.5 percentage points over LIBOR, which in January 
2020 was two percent.17 Another 0.5 percentage point is added to the rate for ongoing insurance 
costs to bring the total to five percent.  
In contrast, borrowing through a property tax deferral program would involve no up-front 
costs and most likely a lower interest rate. If, as discussed above, the government funded the 
program by issuing longer term TANs or RANs, the interest rate plus buffer could be as low as 2.5 
percent as of January 2020.18 In short, the costs for a homeowner to tap home equity would be 
substantially lower through property tax deferral than taking out a reverse mortgage.  
Access to funds. Access to funds has two dimensions: the amount that can be borrowed against 
the house and flexibility in accessing those funds. 
In terms of the maximum amount the homeowner can borrow, a comparison between 
reverse mortgages and property tax deferrals requires some assumptions. The amount available via 
a reverse mortgage depends on the age of the youngest borrower or eligible non-borrowing spouse; 
the current interest rate; and the lesser of the appraised value, the HECM FHA mortgage limit of 
$765,000, or the sale price. Reverse mortgage borrowers can choose equal monthly payments, a 
line of credit, a combination of monthly payments and a line of credit, or a single disbursement 
lump sum. Typically, HECM loans are set up as a line of credit (Pinnacle Actuarial Resources 2019). 
Assume for purposes of comparison, however, that homeowners wanted their money up front. In 
early 2020, the 65-year-old owner of a $500,000 house could receive $230,000 through a reverse 
mortgage. 19 If the owner accessed that money and used the four-percent rule of thumb (the 
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withdrawal rate that should allow the homeowner not to exhaust the principal), the $230,000 would 
provide $9,200 in additional annual income for as long as the homeowner was alive.20  
For the same $500,000 house, property tax deferral would reduce the average homeowner’s 
expenses – and thereby increase income available for items – by $5,000 annually. Thus, the reverse 
mortgage offers the homeowner the ability to borrow more against home equity than a property 
tax deferral program. This relationship holds until the house value exceeds the FHA limit of 
$765,000, after which the gap between the two sources narrows a bit as property tax deferral (as 
proposed) would be applied to the first $1,000,000 of assessed value. In no case, however, could 
a property tax deferral program offer a homeowner hundreds of thousands of dollars up front.  
On the flexibility side, both approaches offer the homeowner some leeway. One advantage 
of property tax deferral is that homeowners can choose to use the program to cover only unusual 
expenditures, such as a new roof, or to use it year after year to supplement their other sources of 
retirement income – although, as noted above, this option raises some administrative issues. 
Reverse mortgages also offer flexibility in that borrowers can (and do) take their money as a line 
of credit. Under the HECM program, any unused balance of the line of credit grows over time at 
the same interest rate used for the loan. So, borrowers selecting this option see an increase over 
time in the amount available to them. The downside of not borrowing all the money available 
through the line of credit is that the homeowner will have paid substantially more in up-front cost 
than necessary.      
The bottom line from the perspective of the household is that the property tax is far less 
complicated and less costly than a reverse mortgage, but for most homeowners the reverse 
mortgage offers the opportunity to access more home equity. Of course, accessing more home 
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equity is not costless; the more that must be repaid with interest at moving or death, the less is left 
for homeowners or their heirs.  
 
Conclusion 
Many retirees will have insufficient money from conventional retirement programs to 
maintain their standards of living when they stop working. To help support themselves, they will 
need to tap their home equity, which is the major asset for most middle-income households. But 
tapping home equity is difficult. Most people are reluctant to downsize and, even when they do, 
they rarely reduce their housing expenses. Reverse mortgages are an option, but most households 
are put off by the enormity of the decision, the complexity of the product, and the high up-front 
costs.  
A statewide property tax deferral program overcomes the hurdles to accessing home equity. 
Property tax deferral does not provide access to as much home equity as a reverse mortgage, but 
the offsetting advantage is that some of the house value after the repayment of the loan and interest 
will be available for a bequest. 
At the household level, the proposed program is revenue-neutral: all taxes owed by a 
participating household are paid back, with interest sufficient to cover the cost of borrowing and 
to cover administrative expenses. Nevertheless, because loans are made well in advance of 
repayments, the sponsor of the plan must cover start-up costs. If the state government simply 
borrowed money to cover the annual outlays, Massachusetts’ ratio of debt-to-GSP would rise from 
14.0 percent to 15.1 percent. The alternative is to involve the private sector. This decision would 
raise the costs to homeowners, but nevertheless may be a necessary step to get a broad-based 
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1 For details on the NRRI methodology, see Munnell, Hou, and Sanzenbacher (2018).  
2 For detailed information on each state’s program, see Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (2019).  
3 In addition, qualified senior homeowners can work off up to $1,500 on their property tax bill by volunteering for 
their city or town. The city or town administers the program, keeping track of hours worked, and credits for each 
hour worked an amount not to exceed the minimum wage ($12.75). Each city or town can change the income limits 
and benefit amounts up to the maximum. The tax work-off credit cannot exceed the total tax due after any other 
exemptions. An approved representative may do the volunteer work for people physically unable to provide such 
services. See Massachusetts Acts of 2016 (2016).   
4 Renters are also eligible for the Circuit Breaker Credit, if one quarter of their annual rent exceeds 10 percent of 
their income. 
5 In Massachusetts, localities may petition the state for permission to set the income limit even higher than the 
Circuit Breaker limit for single head of households. For instance, Newton set their income requirement at $86,000, 
well above the $60,000 Circuit Breaker limit. 
6 Any mortgage lender must agree that the locality’s interest in the property would take priority over all other 
interests (Massachusetts Acts of 2016). 
7 After six months, the Treasurer may petition to foreclose the lien on the property.   
8 The legislation enacting the deferral program will need to provide that the lien continues during the deferral period. 
Under existing law, the lien disappears if foreclosure proceedings are not commenced within a specific period after 
the tax is due. 
9 The ability to turn the deferral on and off would have to be carefully delineated. At a minimum, the election should 
properly be done on an annual – as opposed to a quarterly – basis. In addition, for the homeowner who defers in 
2020, but pays full taxes in 2021, does the 2021 payment go to pay off the 2020 deferral or to cover the current 
year? A simpler, but less flexible, approach would have the election carry forward unless the homeowner revokes 
the deferral and repays the deferral in full.  
10 For example, a 1998 AARP report found that just 20 percent of people who were eligible for property tax relief 
programs knew they existed. But even of those who knew of the programs, just 1.4 percent participated. 
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11 This estimate was derived using Oregon Department of Revenue (2009); Oregon Legislative Revenue Office 
(2001); and authors’ calculations from US Census Bureau, American Community Survey (1960-2008).  
12 Almost 60 percent of Massachusetts homeowners ages 65+ own their home free and clear (US Census Bureau, 
American Community Survey, 2018). 
13 The projection assumes a population growth pattern that follows the UMass Donahue Institute Massachusetts 
Population Projections (2015) for the short term and the SSA Trustees Report (2019) for the long term; a home-
appreciation rate of 0.5 percent in real terms; a 1.2-percent state borrowing rate in real terms; a 14-percent debt-to-
GSP ratio (a stable ratio from 2011 to 2018) in the absence of the program, and a 2.1-percent growth rate for GSP. 
See Appendix D for details on model assumptions. 
14 For information on the agency’s role in encouraging homeownership, see Massachusetts Department of Housing 
(2020).  
15 Ensuring that the property is owner-occupied raises an administrative issue for property tax deferral programs. 
Even though prohibited, a 65-year-old could defer property taxes and then rent out the home. Cities and towns do 
not currently provide any oversight in this area. On the other hand, Mass Housing does have this obligation for some 
of its programs, which offers another reason for considering embedding the program within the agency.   
16 In this example, the origination fee used is the maximum allowed (the greater of $2,500 or 2%of the first 
$200,000 of the home’s value plus 1%of the amount over $200,000); the insurance premium is calculated as 2 
percent of the home value for all borrowers (based on data since late 2017); and the estimate for other closing costs 
(which include appraisal and legal fees) relies on the calculator from the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders 
Association (NRMLA 2020).  
17 The interest rate in this example is an adjustable rate, like most reverse mortgage loans taken out by homeowners. 
The lender’s margin of 2.5 percent comes from NRMLA. For historical statistics, such as adjustable rates and fixed 
rates on all HECM originations, see the monthly publications by the US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.  Interest rates may have declined as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, but this paper relies on rates 
from a less atypical period. 
18 The estimate used here reflects the most recent data available. Given the COVID-19 pandemic, the rate may have 
declined since January 2020.   
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19 HECM Principal Limit Factors (PLFs) provide the percentage of the Maximum Claim Amount (MCA) allowable 
in total cash draws, given the age of the borrower(s) and the ‘expected’ interest rate of the loan. Based on the HECM 
Principal Limit Factor Tables (effective October 2, 2017), the factor for a homeowner at age 65 with the assumed 
interest rate (1-year LIBOR rate plus lender’s margin only) is 0.459, which yields $230,000 for a $500,000 house. 
20 Regarding the 4-percent rule, some investment experts have suggested it is outdated and that individuals would be 
safer using a lower withdrawal given the prolonged environment of low returns on fixed-income portfolios. 
Alternatively, if instead of using any such rule of thumb the homeowner purchased an annuity, the annual income 
would be greater – $14,450 for a single life and $12,200 if the homeowner selected a joint-and survivor product. But 
few people actually purchase annuities. The annuity amount is calculated using market quotes as of January 22, 




Figure 1. Percentage of households ‘at risk’ at age 65 by income group, 2016. 
Note: Households are defined as ‘at risk’ if they are unable to maintain their pre-retirement 
standard of living in retirement.  














Figure 2. Percentage of state single population age 65+ below the Elder Index by property tax 
level, 2019. 
 
Notes: The Elder Index measures the cost of living for older adults by county and state; 
households that fall below the Index lack sufficient income to meet their basic needs.  The 
property tax level is for homeowners age 65+.  
 

































































Figure 3. Massachusetts property tax payers age 65+ and participants in senior tax relief 
programs, FY2019.  
Notes: Circuit Breaker figure is for FY2017 participants.  Exemption and deferral data are for 
FY2019 participants.  
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2018); MA Department of Revenue 




















Figure 4. Sequence groups for home-owning households in the synthetic cohort, 1992-2016.  
 




Figure 5. Annual net property tax deferral program cost, millions of 2019 dollars, 2020-2050. 
 
Source: Authors’ projections of proposed Massachusetts program. 
 














Figure 6. Massachusetts debt relative to gross state product with and without the program, 
assuming 20-percent participation rate, 2020-2100. 
 
Sources: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (2002-
2019); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2018); and authors’ projections. 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
















Debt related to the program Debt without the program
33 
 
Table 1. MA property tax relief provisions for seniors, 2019  
 
  Provision 
Parameter  Circuit breaker Exemptions Deferral 
Age 65+ 70+ a 65+  
Income limit  
$60,000 single 
$13,000 single $15,000 
marriedb  
$20,000 single or 
marriedc $75,000 head of household  
$90,000 joint filers   
Asset limit $808,000 assessed property value  
$28,000 singled  
$30,000 married  None 
Exemption Tax credit up to $1,130 $500 e  Deferral up to 50% of fair cash valuef  
Interest rate N/A N/A 8% 
Payment due  N/A N/A When homeowner sells property or dies 
 
Notes: 
a Locality may reduce to age 65. 
b Locality may raise to $20,000 for single or $30,000 for married.  
c Locality may raise to $60,000.  Localities may petition the state to raise the level even higher    
  (above the Circuit Breaker limit for single head of households).  
d Locality may raise up to $40,000 for single and up to $55,000 for married.  
e Locality may raise to $1,000. 
f Homeowners with a mortgage must get permission from their lender to participate in the  
  program. 
 
Sources: MA Department of Revenue (2019a); and Massachusetts Acts of 2016 (2016).   
 
 
Table 2. Home value remaining and survival probability at selected ages for a household starting 
deferrals at age 65 
 
Age 
Home value used  
plus interest (%) 




95 37  63  29  
100 45  55  8  
105 52  48  1  
 
Note: The calculations assume no mortgage on the property and use the same assumptions as the 
model (see Appendix D).  
  




Appendix A. Outline of Proposed Massachusetts Property Tax Deferral Program  
 
Individuals age 65 or older who have owned a home in MA and occupied it as their principal 
residence for at least five years would be eligible to defer their property taxes.   
 
The state’s new Property Tax Deferral Program procedure would work as follows:  
1. The first-quarter property tax bill for all cities and towns will include a check-box where 
homeowners certify their eligibility for the program and indicate their desire to 
participate on an annual basis. 
 
2. Under Chapter 60 Section 37 of the Massachusetts General Laws, unpaid municipal 
property taxes are automatically secured by a lien on the home. The city or town would 
continue to retain the lien for deferred taxes and interest; and this lien would still be prior 
to other liens, such as mortgages.1 
 
3. For those choosing to participate, the city or town will forward a copy of the property tax 
bill to the MA Department of Revenue. 
 
4. The MA Department of Revenue will send the town an amount equal to the deferred 
taxes.  
 
5. The legislation would provide that the state will be repaid the principal plus interest when 
the homeowner sells the home or dies. In the case of property owned jointly, the state will 
be repaid when the surviving owner sells or dies. The deferral amount can also be repaid 
earlier at the homeowner’s discretion. 
 
6. The homeowner can defer property taxes until the sum of deferrals, accumulated interest, 
and mortgages reaches 60 percent of the first million dollars of assessed value. 
 
7. The interest rate each year will be set at the state’s borrowing cost plus a buffer of 50 
basis points to cover administrative costs and defaults.   
 
8. The state will borrow the funds each year to transfer an amount equal to the deferred 
taxes for that year to the city or town.  
 
9. Once notified that the home has been sold, the city or town will collect the deferred taxes 
plus interest and remit this amount to the state.    
 
10. The deferred taxes and interest would be due within one year, after which the interest rate 




Appendix B. Sample Property Tax Bill  
 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
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Appendix C. Effect of Property Tax Deferral Program on Homeowners in MA 
On average, homeowners age 65+ in MA will be able to defer about $5,000 per year in tax 
expenditures through the proposed program. This average deferral amount varies by county, 
from a low of $3,614 in Bristol County to a high of $5,963 in Middlesex County (see Table C1).  
 
Table C1. Average property value and tax for households age 65+, 2017 
  




(before taxes, $) 
Statewide average 475,754  4,745  63,050  
Barnstable 562,732  4,068  62,460  
Berkshire 326,970  3,378  45,500  
Bristol 332,937  3,614  58,000  
Dukes 652,153  3,525  58,000  
Essex 469,248  5,138  67,070  
Franklin 315,913  4,707  69,700  
Hampden 240,417  3,862  53,700  
Hampshire 294,059  4,325  66,200  
Middlesex 654,093  5,963  71,090  
Nantucket 652,153  3,525  58,000  
Norfolk  590,009  5,644  74,200  
Plymouth  404,798  4,539  62,100  
Suffolk  702,768  3,898  71,900  
Worcester  357,330  4,847  59,250  
 
Note: ACS PUMS is used to calculate county-level statistics; PUMS is a subsample of the full 
ACS IPUMS sample. 
 




Appendix D. Modeling Massachusetts Property Tax Deferral Program  
Table D1. Modeling assumptions and sources for statewide Massachusetts deferral program   
Variable Assumption Sources 
Economic Variables 
Housing price appreciation 0.5 percent real 
All-Transactions House Price 
Index for the United States 
(1980-2018). 
State sorrowing cost 1.2 percent real  See note a. 
Demographic Variables   
Homeowners age 65+ in MA 506,332 US Census Bureau, 2018 American Community Survey  
Average MA home value $475,754  US Census Bureau, 2018 American Community Survey   
Average MA property tax rate 1 percent  US Census Bureau, 2018 American Community Survey   
Mortality Age-based period life table SSA Period Life Table, 2019 
Population growth 
Based on UMass (2019-
2035); and SSA (2035-
2100).  
UMass Donahue Institute 
Population Projections (2015); 
2019 SS Trustees Report 
 
Program Variables 
Borrowing cap 60 percent of home value assuming no mortgage Program assumption 
Interest charged to household 
State borrowing cost + 50 
basis points for 
administration  
Program assumption 
When deferral and interest paid 
back for married Households 
When last member of a 
couple dies 
Assumption for estimate 
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Participation rate 20 percent NRRIb 
Phase-in period for the program 5 years Program assumption 
 
Notes:  
a Massachusetts assumed borrowing rate is based on a 10-year general obligation bond rate, 
which historically tracks closely to the 10-year Treasury bond rate. The 10-year Treasury 
yield over the past two decades averaged 1.2 percent in real terms. Financial institutions 
such as J.P. Morgan use the same long-run projection for 10-year Treasury bonds. See 
Electronic Municipal Market Access, Massachusetts General Obligation Bond Rates (2003-
2019); J.P. Morgan (2019); and FRED 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (1962-
2019).  
b Share of NRRI home-owning households ages 55-59 who are at risk of being unable to 
maintain pre-retirement standard of living with no bequest motive plus half of at risk 
households with a moderate bequest motive. 
 
Endnote 
1 The legislation enacting the deferral program will need to provide that the lien continues during the deferral 
period. Under existing law, the lien disappears if foreclosure proceedings are not commenced within a specific 
period after the tax is due. 
                                                            
